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     Information asymmetry is a common phenomenon everywhere. This dissertation 
studies this phenomenon through observing the equity market both in the developed 
country and in the emerging market and observing both the initial price offering 
market and the secondary equity market.   
     Chapter one develops a simple model that relates the clustering of IPOs to moral 
hazard. The number of IPOs in the economy is shown to be a decreasing function of 
agency costs. The paper uses a framework in which agency costs linked to 
entrepreneur net worth are related to the business cycle. It is shown that when business 
activity is high(low), agency costs from moral hazard are low(high). Then, our model 
yields the stylized fact that the number of IPOs is highest around equity prices’ peaks. 
Based on the data from 1970 to 2008, it is found that the current ratio, the quick ratio, 
and the cash ratio are positively related to the number of IPOs in the economy, and 
that the number of bankruptcy filings is negatively related to the number of IPOs in 
the economy.  
     Chapter two studies a phenomenon in China’s stock market. Listed firms bought 
and sold other listed firms in 2007 when the market was booming so that their net 
earnings were boosted. The paper finds that those that participated in these stock 
transactions and relied heavily on these earnings in 2007 benefited from the booming 
stock market and had positive growth in investment income in 2007, which lead to 
 positive growth in net earnings in 2007. These firms suffered from the declining stock 
market in 2008 and had a negative growth rate in investment net income in 2008 and, 
thus, a negative growth rate in net earnings. This earnings reversal is proved by the 
smaller earnings persistence of investment net income than that of main operating 
income. The stock price acts as if investors correctly understand the information in the 
main operating income and the investment net income jointly.  
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CHAPTER 1 
IPO CLUSTERING: A MORAL HAZARD EXPLANATION 
1.1 Introduction 
IPO clustering is an important phenomenon that is studied in the Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) literature. The purpose of this paper is to propose and test a formal 
model that explains why IPOs cluster around equity peaks. The literature has 
suggested one major explanation, market timing, but this paper offers a new 
explanation and explores the mechanism behind IPO clustering from a moral hazard 
perspective. 
Many empirical studies have demonstrated that IPOs cluster in time, particularly 
at equity peaks. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 
(1988,1994) show the fluctuation of the numbers of IPOs. Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
Gomper and Lerner (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002), Lowry and Schwert (2002) and 
Lowry (2003) graph yearly and monthly numbers of IPOs, and demonstrate the 
existence of IPO cycles in various time periods from as early as 1935 to 2001. 
Moreover, it has been found that IPO market cycles tend to move with economic 
cycles. Marsh (1982) suggests that firms tend to issue equity when the stock market is 
at its peak. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) shows that firms’ equity issuance is 
positively related to business cycle variables. Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) 
shows that, in most countries studied, equity financing clusters at equity peaks.  
The explanation for IPO clustering in the literature has focused on whether the 
firm or the underwriter has timing ability. Lucas and Mcdonald (1990) suggests that 
firms know when they are undervalued and when they observe that the bear market 
tends to give them a low price, firms choose to wait for the coming of the bull market 
which gives more favorable price. This story indicates the firm’s ability of identifying 
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when it is undervalued. Since that study, studies proposing firms’ ability of identifying 
when they are overvalued have appeared. Ritter (1991) documents the long-run 
underperformance of IPO firms compared to a portfolio of matched firms and 
indicates that issuers have the timing ability to take advantage of “windows of 
opportunity”. Loughran and Ritter (1995) further demonstrates that underperformance 
exists in seasoned equity offering as well, and suggests that investment banks take 
companies public when they can get the highest price possible for their shares. Lerner 
(1994) studies the ability of venture capitalists to time IPOs by going public when 
equity prices are high and using private financing when prices are lower. The above 
studies indicate that issuers can time idiosyncratic returns. Baker and Wurgler (2000) 
find that issuing activity is positively correlated with indicators of timing ability: 
insider trading profits, closed-end fund discounts, and consumer sentiment. They 
suggest that equity financing can predict one-year-ahead market returns and that 
issuers have the ability to time market returns. Regardless of idiosyncratic returns or 
market returns, these studies propose that firms or underwriters have timing ability. 
However, recent studies challenge this explanation by suggesting “pseudo market 
timing.” Schultz (2003) first raises the term “pseudo-timing” in explaining IPO 
clustering. The idea is that IPOs cluster around equity peaks, because firms go public 
when prices are high, without necessarily having timing ability. He argues that long-
run under-performance after an IPO is evidence for issuers’ timing ability. However, if 
researchers use the event-time approach to calculate returns, as has been done in these 
studies, obtaining long-run under-performance after the IPO is not surprising. 
Therefore, one cannot argue whether firms have timing ability based on long-term 
under performance. Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) supports Schultz (2003) in 
extending the pseudo-timing argument to the aggregate level to account for Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2000) result without the event-time calculation. The paper provides 
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evidence to reject the timing ability argument and argues that pseudo-timing cannot be 
rejected. Ball, Chiu and Smith (2009) provides results consistent with those of Butler, 
Grullon, and Weston (2005), in support of the pseudo-timing argument. 
 Since no explanation of timing ability has reached consensus, we propose 
another explanation, wherein moral hazard is at the center of the cyclical behavior in 
the frequency of IPOs. Essentially, firms would want to initiate an IPO when the 
moral hazard related to insiders hurting outside investors is low. It has been shown by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), in a formal model, that moral hazard is the source of 
economic cyclical dynamics. Basically, moral hazard is highest(lowest) when 
economic activity is lowest(highest). The moral hazard in question is a costly state 
verification that is higher(lower) when borrower net worth is lower(higher). Borrower 
net worth will be higher(lower) when economic activity is higher(lower). Hence, 
moral hazard is a monotonic decreasing function of economic activity. Since firms 
prefer to go public when moral hazard is low, we expect more IPOs when the 
economic cycle is around a peak. Since economic cycles and equity cycles are highly 
correlated, this would explain why we see a larger number of IPOs around equity 
peaks.  
      This paper finds that moral hazard proxied by financial accounting information 
and bankruptcy information can explain IPO clustering at equity peaks. When the 
current ratio, cash ratio, or quick ratio increases, the number of IPOs increases as well. 
When the number of business bankruptcy filings increases, the number of IPOs 
decreases. After controlling the free cash flow problem, it is found that the results 
continue to hold.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section I we present the model, 
derive the optimal financial contracts, and express agency cost and the number of 
IPOs as a function of the business cycle. Section II presents the framework for 
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empirical testing of the model. Section III presents the data and summary statistics. 
The results are in section IV. Finally, section V concludes. 
 
1.2 The Model 
  The model is derived from Bernanke and Gertler (1989), which explains the 
business cycle from the perspective of the borrowers’ net worth. This paper borrows 
their model and applies one of their conclusions to explain the IPO cycle phenomenon. 
Thus, we only present the part that is relevant to our analysis and derive the part that is 
needed to support the hypothesis. 
    
A) The Economy 
Consider an economy with overlapping generations of two-period lived agents 
belonging to two classes (see Diamond, 1965). It will be convenient to assume that 
there is a countable infinity of agents in each generation1. An exogenous fraction η  
of individuals in each generation are called “entrepreneurs.” The rest are “investors.” 
Entrepreneurs and investors differ in endowments and preferences (both are risk-
neutral). Only entrepreneurs have access to new projects. Entrepreneurs are indexed 
by an efficiency parameter ω . There are two goods, a capital good and an output 
good. Denote risk-free rate by r. A project belonging to an entrepreneur of type ω  
takes as input exactly x(ω ) units of the output good. The amount of capital produced 
by a given project is a discrete random variable with two possible 
outcomesκ κ κ κ1 2 2 1and with > . The probability of outcome 
κ π κ π1 1 2 2is and that of is . Asymmetric information is introduced in the model by 
assuming that the realized outcome of any particular investment project is costlessly 
                                                 
1
 An implication of this assumption is that we will generally have to deal in per capita, rather than 
aggregate, quantities. 
5
observable only by the entrepreneur who operates that project.  Other agents in the 
economy can learn the realized returns of a given project only by employing an 
auditing technology. This technology absorbs γ  units of the capital good when 
operated, but reveals the outcome of the audited project to everyone in the economy 
and without error. Random auditing is allowed. Let p denote the probability of an 
audit. Entrepreneurs can save the part of their wealth that is not consumed. Denote 
average entrepreneurial savings by Se. Finally, let the expected relative price of capital 
be q
^
. 
The output produced by the production function is: 
     yt = θt f (kt)     (1) 
where: yt is amount produced 
 θt is a random aggregate productivity shock 
 kt is the amount of capital per head 
With respect to capital production, the next period capital stock per head is: 
     kt+1 = (κ - ht γ)it    (2) 
where: it is the number of investments projects and 
 ht is the fraction of projects that are audited. 
We also assume 
,)0()0( γκθ +>′ rxf     (3) 
).1()( rxf <′ κκηθ     (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) will be sufficient to guarantee that it is always profitable for 
some but not all entrepreneurs to operate the project. 
Individual preferences are defined over lifetime consumption (there is no disutility of 
labor). We assume that entrepreneurs care only about expected consumption when old. 
That is, they are risk-neutral and do not consume when young. Investors consume in 
both periods; investors born in t have identical utility functions of the form 
6
U(zyt) + βEt(zot+1),         (5) 
Where zyt and zot+1 are the consumption of the representative period-t investor when 
young and old, respectively, U(.) is of the usual concave form, and β is a discount 
factor2. 
We will focus on the behavior of this model economy in a competitive market 
environment. In such an environment, our agents’ labor supply and 
consumption/saving behavior are easy to describe. Labor is supplied inelastically, so 
the average entrepreneurial saving (when young) is: 
Ste = wt Le      (6) 
where wt is the wage per unit of labor 
Le is the labor endowment of the entrepreneur 
The average savings by Investors is: 
  St = wt L - zy* (r)    (7) 
where zy* (r) is optimal consumption by Investors, and L is the endowment of the 
investor3. 
Equations (6) and (7) establish a direct link between wages and savings. The idea is 
that when the economy is doing well, there will be more savings (and more wealth). 
Entrepreneurs are characterized by the NPV (Net Present Value) of their 
project. Denote the NPV of the new project (per share) bf. The subscript f is an index 
that designates a firm with a specific level of NPV. f is distributed over continuous 
finite support. Denote the lower bound on f by f  and the upper bound on f by f . 
We define the two variables above “per share.” As will be shown below, the NPV of 
                                                 
2 The assumptions that entrepreneurs and investors have different utility functions and, in particular, 
that entrepreneurs do not consume when young are inessential. 
3 As a normalization, we assume that the economy-wide per capita labor endowment, η Le + (1 - η)L, 
is equal to one. This allows us to avoid the distinction between per capita and per labor-input variables. 
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projects depends on the entrepreneur’s efficiency ω. Each entrepreneur has to make a 
binary decision. The first choice is that he can implement the project. In this case he 
must realize an IPO (go public) to get the additional funds to finance the project. The 
second choice is that he does not do anything (no implementation of the project and no 
IPO). Implementing the project implies initiating the IPO and vice-versa. Subscribers 
to the firm’s shares (in the case in which an IPO is initiated) are assumed to be in 
perfect competition (they will have zero profits from buying the IPO shares). In this 
case, we have a rationality constraint that will bind, and make the investors pay 
exactly the value of the shares they are subscribing to (ex-ante). 
We focus on the asymmetric information concerning moral hazard related to 
the net worth of the firm. This moral hazard will materialize in an agency cost. A 
standard result is that investors are rational and will make the firm bear this cost. 
Agency costs will be shown to depend on the economic cycle. 
B) The Optimal Financial Contract 
The optimal contract is found by application of the revelation principle. 
Formally, the entrepreneur’s problem is to maximize his expected next-period 
consumption, subject to the constraints that 
(i) the investor(s) receive an expected rate of return of no less than r. 
(ii) the entrepreneur has no incentive to lie about realized project outcomes. 
(iii) the state contingent consumptions and auditing probabilities are feasible. 
General random auditing strategies are allowed, and may be significantly more 
efficient than nonrandom strategies (see Townsend, 1979). An implication of allowing 
random auditing is that the optimal contract will not be in the form of a debt contract, 
as it is when auditing is nonrandom (see Mookherjee and Ping, 1987; Townsend, 
1988). Importantly, our macro results are essentially the same whether stochastic 
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auditing is permitted or not. 
It can be shown that, under the optimal contract no auditing occurs when the 
best possible state (here, state 2) is announced4. Thus, investors audit only when the 
entrepreneur declares the bad state (state 1). Let p be the probability of an audit in the 
bad state, let ci be the entrepreneur’s consumption payoff when he announces state i (i 
= 1, 2) and is not audited, and let ca be his consumption payoff when he announces the 
bad state and is audited5. Then, the optimal contract is found by choosing the vector 
{p, c1, c2, ca} to solve 
2211 ))1((max ccppc
a ππ +−+    (8) 
subject to 
),(]ˆ[])1()ˆ(ˆ[ 222111
ea Sxrcqcpqcpq −≥−+−−+− κπγκπ        (9)  
),)(ˆ)(1( 1122 cqpc +−−≥ κκ                       (10) 
 ,01 ≥c                               (11) 
 ,0≥ac                              (12) 
 ,10 ≤≤ p                              (13) 
where qˆ  is the expected (next-period) relative price of capital. 
The optimal contract is as follows6. There are two regimes: In the first regime, the 
entrepreneur’s net worth is sufficiently large that he is able to pay the investors their 
required return even in the bad state. That is 
    ).)((ˆ 1
eSxrq −≥ ωκ      (14) 
There is no agency problem in this case, since the entrepreneur can always pay off. 
Optimal auditing probabilities are always zero, and the investor’s payoff is 
independent of the project’s outcome. If entrepreneurial savings Se are insufficient, so 
that (14) fails, there will be positive agency costs.  
                                                 
4 See the appendix in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for a formal derivation of this and its results.  
5 More precisely, ca is the payoff if the entrepreneur is audited and found to be telling the truth. The 
optimal payoff if the entrepreneur is audited and found to be lying is easily shown to be zero. 
6 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for a formal proof. 
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C) Agency Costs as a Function of the Business Cycle 
 We want to derive agency costs endogenously as a function of the economic 
cycle. We therefore adopted a neoclassical model of the business cycle in which the 
condition of entrepreneurs’ balance sheets is a source of output dynamics. The 
mechanism is that higher entrepreneur net worth reduces the agency costs of financing 
new projects. Business upturns improve net worth, lower agency costs, and increase 
investment, and this amplifies the upturn (the reverse is true for downturns). What is 
most interesting to us is the level of agency costs as implied by the state of the 
economy. We next show that agency costs are high(low) when business activity is 
low(high). 
 The optimal financial contract under the general equilibrium framework 
described above is shown (in section II B) to be as follows. Investors will commit to 
auditing with probability p, whenever the entrepreneur reports the bad outcome κ1 . p 
is shown to be such that:  
                                     p
r x S q
q q
e
=
− −
− −
( ( ) )
( )
^
^ ^
ω κ
π κ κ π γ
1
2 2 1 1
              (15) 
The optimal auditing probability p is just sufficient to guarantee that the entrepreneur 
will report honestly when the good state occurs. 
We denote Ψ the agency costs induced by moral hazard (per share). Expected agency 
cost which we identify with expected auditing costs is then: 
      γπ
^
1 qp=Ψ ,    (16) 
Agency costs are simply the probability of the bad state, times the probability of an 
audit given the bad state, times the cost of implementing an audit. 
Substituting (15) in (16) we get: 
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1)(
))((
12
1
2
1
^
−−
−−
=Ψ
κκ
γπ
π
κω qSxr e
        (17) 
The above expression says that Ψ will be high(low) when business activity is 
low(high)7. The intuition for this result is as follows. In good times, when profits are 
high and balance sheets are healthy, it is easier for firms to obtain outside funds. The 
converse is true in bad times. 
D) The Number of IPOs and the Business Cycle 
The firm will decide to initiate the IPO and implement the project if the NPV is 
positive (taking into account agency costs). 
 More formally, the firm will initiate the IPO if 
           0>fb .     (18) 
where  
bf = g(ω, Ψ),     (19) 
and  
                           0>
∂
∂
ω
fb ; .0<
Ψ∂
∂ fb     (20) 
The firm will not initiate the IPO otherwise, and will forgo the project. If a project is 
not implemented, it is lost for the firm. The NPV of the project is an increasing 
function of the entrepreneur’s efficiency . 
 As shown above, the decision to initiate an IPO is a function of the NPV of the 
project, which is a function of agency costs and the entrepreneur’s ability. The more 
projects with positive NPV, the more IPOs. Therefore, the number of IPOs is 
                                                 
7 For more details, see Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 
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decreasing in terms of agency costs. Since agency costs are decreasing in business 
activity, this implies that the number of IPOs is increasing in business activity. And 
finally, since equity prices are increasing in business activity (with some lead or lag), 
the number of IPOs will increase in terms of equity prices. 
 
1.3 Empirical Framework 
We subject the two explanations (moral hazard and market timing) to empirical 
testing. 
Model:           IPO = β0 + β1*MH + β2*PRICE + ε            (21) 
where MH is a proxy of moral hazard, and PRICE is a proxy for equity price values. 
If the moral hazard theory is correct, then MH should be negative. If the 
market timing explanation is correct, then PRICE should be positive. Here we do not 
distinguish market timing from pseudo market timing. The fundamental difference 
between market timing and pseudo market timing is very subtle. In fact, both argue 
that firms initiate IPOs when prices are high. The difference is whether firms or 
underwriters subjectively know in advance that a firm is overvalued. Without 
discussing whether firms have identified a high price as an overvalued price, we 
simply use the price as a proxy to reflect a timing opportunity, no matter if it is due to 
an over-valued price level or simply because it is a high price. The focus of our model 
is to test the role of moral hazard in the aggregate IPO activities. The above model is 
based on a set of time-series data representing aggregate IPO activities, aggregate 
financial health situations and aggregate price levels from 1970 to 2008.  
a) The dependent variables (proxy for IPO activity) are defined as follows:   
1. IPO/GDP is the average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly listed 
firms to the gross domestic product. In other words, it is Initial Public 
Offerings in dollar amounts as a percentage of GDP. 
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2. IPO/CPI is the average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly listed 
firms to the consumer price index. 
3. LN_NOIPO is the natural log of the number of initial public offerings per 
month. 
GDP and CPI are used to get a pure cycle of IPO activities without any effect of 
the aggregate economy. As IPO_GDP and IPO_CPI are based on dollar amounts of 
equity issued, it is possible that the number of IPO firms is small but each firm issued 
a large amount of shares. Thus IPO_GDP and IPO_CPI do not allow us to observe if 
there was a large number of IPOs during the period of time. To account for this, we 
also use the number of firms initiating IPOs to test the hypothesis. In order to control 
for outliers, we take the natural log of IPO numbers.  
b) Moral hazard independent variables 
A firm’s accounting solvency ratio represents its ability to pay back debt, and is 
what lenders care most about. If a firm’s ability is very poor, the agency cost of 
borrowers will be very high and the likelihood of lending will be small. Thus we use 
accounting solvency ratios to measure moral hazard. We expect that if a solvency ratio 
is high on average, moral hazard will be less likely and more IPOs will be observed 
than if the ratio is low. Specifically, we use the following ratios:   
 current ratio = total current assets / total current liabilities 
 quick ratio = (total current assets – inventory) / total current liabilities 
 cash ratio = cash / total current liabilities 
These are the most basic and simplest indicators of a firm’s ability to pay back its 
current debt with what is at hand. 
The number of business bankruptcy filings is another indicator of the aggregate 
ability to pay back debt in the economy during a period of time. If the number of 
filings is high, this indicates that there is a large number of firms that have failed to 
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pay back the debt and make profit. Therefore, we expect that if there is a high number 
of filings, the moral hazard is high and we should expect to see low level of IPO 
activities.   
     c)  Pricing independent variables: 
We propose a simple indicator to measure periods when there is a high equity 
price and those when there is a low equity price. We take the natural log of the S&P 
500 index and subtract its one-year moving average. If the difference is very large and 
positive, that indicates periods of high prices. If the difference is very small, that 
indicates periods of smooth price movement. If the difference is very negative, that 
indicates periods of low prices. A high positive difference period indicates 
opportunities to observe high prices and to initiate an IPO at a high price. A negative 
difference period indicates a relatively low price and the possibility of postponing 
IPOs. Thus we use this variable to proxy the timing hypothesis. We expect that if the 
difference is positive and large, there are more timing possibilities and more IPO 
activity. In the opposite case, there are fewer timing possibilities and less IPO activity.  
     d)  Control variable: investment opportunity set 
We use the investment opportunity set as a control for the above model (21). 
This control variable proxies the free cash flow problem. The free cash flow problem 
is that managers tend to waste a company’s excess cash that is not invested. This is 
another type of moral hazard. If there are investment opportunities, managers’ free 
cash flow problem will be less severe. Thus, by using the investment opportunity set 
variables as a control, we are able to see whether, in periods of time that in aggregate 
have the same degrees of investment opportunities in the economy (thus the same 
degrees of free cash flow problems), better borrowers’ net worth indicates more IPO 
activity. Following Adam and Goyal (2007), we use the following four variables to 
measure the investment opportunity set: 
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MBA = the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets 
MBE = the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity 
EP = earnings to price 
CEPPE = the ratio of firms’ capital expenditures to net plant property and 
equipment 
 
1.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
The data used was derived from public company averages since 1970 for key 
variables to be discussed later. The data was obtained from multiple sources. The time 
period used was from 1970, inclusive, to 2008, inclusive. Furthermore, the data was 
examined on monthly bases. 
Three variables are used to measure IPO activities in the market: IPO_GDP, 
IPO_CPI and IPON. IPO_GDP includes two different data: IPO and GDP. IPO here is 
obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. It is defined as 
the total dollar amount of stocks issued by new U.S. Corporate in a period and the unit 
is in millions. This data is released monthly. GDP is obtained from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and is announced by quarter. GDP here is in current dollars and 
seasonally adjusted. As the GDP announced each quarter is annualized, the data is 
divided by 12 and converted into per month. GDP here is converted to millions, as 
well, to be consistent with IPO. Thus IPO_GDP is calculated based on the obtained 
data on IPO and GDP. IPO_GDP represents IPO activity in the market, controlling for 
effects of general economic conditions. IPO_CPI is another variable to measure 
overall IPO activity in the market. IPO in the IPO_CPI is the same as the IPO in 
IPO_GDP. CPI here is the US all urban consumer price index reported each month. 
CPI is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It also functions as a control for 
the effects of inflation. As CPI is released monthly, IPO_CPI is calculated using CPI 
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directly, without transformation. IPON is a different way to measure IPO activity. It 
represents the number of companies that issue IPOs in a period. Instead of considering 
the dollar value of an IPO, this variable excludes cases in which the IPO is highly 
valued by one or a few companies. This variable measures IPO activity in the market 
from another perspective. IPON is obtained from the Securities Data Company, which 
provides information concerning firms’ major financial activities, such as equity issues 
and M&A. IPON is available monthly from 1970 to 2008.  
As described earlier, delnspx measures the timing ability of institutional 
investors. To calculate this variable, S&P 500 from 1969 to 2008 is obtained from 
Datastream. Datastream provides stock trading data as well as data on other financial 
instruments with coverage of the global market. The data frequency of this variable is 
by month and it is calculated based on the monthly S&P500 index.        
     In this paper, the accounting variables CURRENT, QUICK and CASH are one 
group to measure moral hazard. They are all obtained from COMPUSTAT, which 
provides accounting information for the listed firms. As financial statements are 
released quarterly, the above accounting items all represent quarterly data. These 
variables are all ratios; thus, months within the same quarters are assigned the same 
value, and this allows testing on monthly bases. The following shows how the ratios 
are calculated using COMPUSTAT notation: 
     CURRENT=current asset/current liabilities 
     QUICK=(current asset-inventory)/current liabilities 
     CASH=cash/current liabilities 
Bankruptcy information is another approach to measuring moral hazards. Here 
four variables are used: BANKSIM/CPI, BANKINT/CPI, BANKSIM/GDP and 
BANKIN/GDP. GDP and CPI are the same as those used for the IPO variables. The 
bankruptcy data here uses the number of US business bankruptcy filings and is 
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measured in units. The data comes from two sources. Data from 1970 to 2003/03 is 
provided by Andrew P. Meyer from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In 
particular, data from 1970 to 1979 is on a yearly basis; data from 1980 to 1990 is on a 
quarterly basis; and data from 1991 to 2003/03 is on a monthly basis. The data from 
2003/04 to 2008/12 is obtained from the American Bankruptcy Institute website. The 
data from this source is on a quarterly basis only. These two sources jointly present 
data from 1970 to 2008 at different frequencies. Conversion is conducted for 
bankruptcy data that is not on a monthly basis. Two approaches are adopted. One is to 
calculate the simple average and the other is to do the linear interpolation in order to 
assign each month a value. After a value is assigned to each month, the data is scaled 
by GDP and CPI separately to control for the general economic effect. As a result, 
four variables, BANKSIM/CPI, BANKINT/CPI, BANKSIM/GDP and 
BANKIN/GDP, are obtained. 
    We follow Adam and Goyal (2007) to measure the investment opportunity 
variable. The data is from Compustat and released quarterly. Based on the same logic 
as that for the accounting variables above, these proxies are ratios; thus, the ratio for 
one quarter can be assumed to be the same as ratios for months within the quarter. 
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the above mentioned variables. 
The total number of observations is 468. The time period is from 1970 to 2008. The 
data frequency for the analysis is on a monthly basis. Regarding the IPO variables, 
there is one missing data for the dollar amount of stocks newly issued; thus, the 
IPO_GDP and IPO_CPI only have 467 observations. The number of quarterly 
observations for the accounting information should be 156. Due to the missing values, 
the number of observations varies for different accounting variables and for the 
investment opportunity set variables. 
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1.5 Empirical Results 
Consistent with the earlier studies, the numbers of IPOs per month exhibits a 
cyclical pattern. We graph the IPO volume from 1970 to the most recent year for 
which we have data, 2008 (Figure 1.1). In order to exclude the effect of the aggregate 
economy, we also graph monthly dollar IPO activity adjusted by GDP. It is shown in 
Figure 1.2 that aggregate IPO activity without the effect of the overall economy also 
exhibits a cyclical pattern. Moreover, Figure 1.2 compares the pattern of IPOs and 
economic growth over the years. It can be seen that when the economy has high 
growth, total equity issued, adjusted by GDP, also tends to be high. As peaks in the 
stock market are associated with high economic growth periods, the above 
observations jointly lead to the question this paper is trying to answer: why IPOs 
cluster at equity peaks.  
     This paper suggests that moral hazard can explain why IPOs cluster at equity 
peaks. When the economy is doing well, there are more good opportunities for firms 
to make profits and, thus firms’ net worth will be better. In turn, agency costs will be 
lower and more IPOs will be observed during a strong economy. To first demonstrate 
this proposal, the correlation between GDP and the various accounting variables is 
tested to see whether the strong economy indicates high net worth of firms in the 
economy. Table 1.2 gives the Pearson correlation coefficients between GDP and 
Current, Quick and Cash. It shows that each of these three accounting variables is 
positively correlated with GDP and the correlations for the Quick and Cash are above 
0.70. The correlation between GDP and Current is 0.5998, which is also positive and 
significant. Therefore, the correlation test supports the idea that borrowers’ net worth 
in aggregate is positively linked to the business cycle.  
Table 1.3 gives the key results of this paper, showing that the borrowers’ net 
worth measured by Current can explain IPO activity. The coefficient of Current for 
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IPO_GDP is 0.00244, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The adjusted R2 
is 0.2108 for the regression of Current on IPO_GDP. The coefficient of Delnspx is 
0.01628, and it is statistically significant, which supports the timing hypothesis. This 
means that both moral hazard and market timing play a role in explaining why IPOs 
cluster at equity peaks. When the regression is based on IPO_CPI, the result is the 
same. Since the IPO_GDP and IPO_CPI use total dollar equity issued as dependent 
variables, it means that the higher the borrower’s net worth, the larger the dollar 
amount of newly issued equity, and not necessarily the higher number of IPO firms. 
Thus we use LNIPON to test again. The result is consistent with the regression on 
IPO_GDP and IPO_CPI and the coefficient on the Current is positive and statistically 
significant. Adjusted R2 is highest for the regression with LNIPON. Current is one of 
three accounting variables that measure moral hazard in this paper. Table 1.3 also 
gives the result for the other two accounting measures: Cash and Quick. Both Cash 
and Quick can explain IPO activities. The coefficients on Cash and on Quick are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, regardless of which dependent 
variable is used. Delnspx is robustly significant and positive across all regressions. 
Adjusted R2 is highest for the regression with LNIPON among all the dependent 
variables.  
Table 1.4 provides results from the bankruptcy analysis. The more business 
bankruptcy filings, the worse borrowers’ net worth in aggregate is in the economy. 
Therefore it is expected that business bankruptcy is negatively related to IPO activity. 
Table 1.4 consists of two parts. Part I regresses the bankruptcy variable based on a 
simple average of various dependent variables. As bankruptcy data is adjusted by GDP 
and CPI, respectively, the regression should correspond to the IPO_GDP and 
IPO_CPI. The coefficient of Banksimg on IPO_GDP is negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that business bankruptcy filings are negatively related to the 
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number of IPOs, and this is consistent with our expectation. When the economy is bad, 
the likelihood of more bankruptcy filings is higher than in the good times. A high 
record of bankruptcy filings indicates poor borrowers’ net worth in the economy, and 
this increases agency costs, which lowers the number of IPOs in the aggregate 
economy. The timing hypothesis is supported in this regression. Both moral hazard 
and market timing can explain IPO clustering at equity peaks. The regression of 
Banksimc on IPO_CPI provides a similar result. The coefficients for both IPO_GDP 
and IPO_CPI regressions are all highly significant. LNIPON is not adjusted by GDP 
or CPI, so the effects of Banksimg and Banksimc are tested separately on LNIPON. 
The coefficient of Banksimg on LNIPON is negative and significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficient of Banksimc on LNIPON is negative but not statistically significant. 
This indicates that the moral hazard hypothesis is supported based on the regression of 
Banksimg on LNIPON, but not on the regression of Banksimc on LNIPON. However, 
the timing hypothesis is consistently supported by both of these regressions on 
LNIPON. The second part of Table 1.4 reports the results of the bankruptcy data based 
on linear interpolation. The result in this part is similar to that in part I. The market 
timing hypothesis is consistently supported in all of the regressions. The coefficients 
on the bankruptcy-related variables are all negative and are consistent with our 
expectations, yet only the coefficient of Bankintc on LNIPON is not statistically 
significant. 
We also test whether past financial health of firms in the economy can have 
predictive power on aggregate IPO activity. Table 1.5 presents the effect of the ability 
to pay back debt in the past on IPO_GDP. We test the effect of Current ratio in the 
previous month, two months ago, three months ago, and half a year ago on IPO_GDP. 
It is found that the Current variable is not only positively related to the IPO_GDP in 
the current month but also all of the Current variables for one month ago, two months 
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ago, three months ago, and half a year ago are positively correlated with IPO_GDP. 
This means that if the average ability to pay back debt of firms in the economy is 
strong, IPO activities will more likely be observed in one month, two months, three 
months, and even in half a year. All of these results are statistically significant at the 
1% level. The moral hazard hypothesis is robust in several time ranges. Additionally, 
for each lagged analysis, the market timing hypothesis is supported. However, 
adjusted R2, in general, decreases as the lagged period lengthens.  
Table 1.6 shows how lagged bankruptcy variables affect the IPO_GDP. The 
table uses Banksimg as the independent variable and tests whether past bankruptcy 
records can predict IPO activity in the future. We examine bankruptcy filings one 
month ago, two months ago, three months ago, and half a year ago. The results show 
that each of these is negatively related to the IPO_GDP, and each is statistically 
significant except for the banksimg, which lagged by three months.  Moreover, 
Delnspx is statistically significant at the 1% level and positively correlated with 
IPO_GDP.  On average adjusted R2 decreases as the number of lags increases. This 
indicates that past bankruptcy records can explain active IPO activity in the future, but 
to a lesser extent than more recent bankruptcy records.  
Table 1.5 and Table 1. 6 present the effect of Current and Banksimg on 
IPO_GDP. We also replicate the analysis of Current and Banksimg for IPO_CPI and 
LNIPON as dependent variables. Additionally, we perform the same lag analysis for 
Cash, Quick, Banksimc, Bankintg, and Bankintc. All of the analysis shows similar 
results, indicating that past financial health can predict future IPO activities.   
From Table 1.3 to Table 1.6, the analysis uses the moral hazard proxies and the 
timing proxy. In order to control for the effect of the free cash flow problem, we redo 
the analysis from Table 1.3 to Table 1. 6 and present results from Table 1.7 to Table 
1.10. We only present results with MBA as a control. On the one hand, the is because 
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results with other investment opportunity set variables is similar to that with MBA. On 
the other hand, Adam and Goyal (2007) finds that MBA contains the highest amount 
of information related to investment opportunities. The results with MBA show that 
controlling for the free cash flow problem, better borrowers’ net worth and better 
financial health of firms is associated with more IPO activity. This is not only the case 
for the effect of the current financial condition on current IPO activity, but also is 
reflected in the effect of the current financial condition on IPO activity in one month, 
two months, three months, and half a year. In other words, after controlling for the free 
cash flow problem, our conclusion on the effect of moral hazard remains the same.  
   
1.6 Conclusion 
     There is extensive empirical evidence that IPOs tend to cluster around equity 
price peaks. An explanation in the literature is that underwriters have timing ability, or 
there is a pseudo-timing ability such that underwriters take firms to IPO when 
observing high equity prices. The model presented in this paper proposes an 
alternative explanation. In this explanation, underwriters do not have timing ability. 
IPOs cluster around equity price peaks because moral hazard is the lowest around 
those peaks. More firms will tend to initiate share offerings when moral hazard is 
lowest because more firms will be able to avoid agency costs. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) propose an asymmetric information model of the business cycle in which the 
condition of borrowers’ balance sheets is a source of output dynamics. The mechanism 
is that higher borrower net worth reduces agency costs of financing real capital 
investments. Business upturns improve net worth and lower agency costs (the reverse 
is true for downturns). Then, firms will tend to go public around equity peaks because 
this is a point in the business cycle where firms are most credit worthy and moral 
hazard is lowest. This paper finds that moral hazard proxied by financial accounting 
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information and bankruptcy information supports its hypothesis. When the current 
ratio, cash ratio or quick ratio increase, the number of IPOs increases as well. When 
the number of business bankruptcy filings increases, the number of IPOs decreases. 
After controlling for the free cash flow problem, it is found that these results continue 
to hold.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CAN THE MARKET IDENTIFY  
THE INFORMATION CONTENT IN THE INVESTMENT NET INCOME? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
China, as one of the largest emerging markets, is gaining more and more 
attention from practitioners and scholars around the world. China’s economy, its stock 
market and its investors produce a lot of interesting phenomena for economists as the 
country is developing rapidly. This paper studies one phenomenon that appeared in the 
2007 stock market: listed firms took the advantage of the stock market and actively 
engaged in buying and selling stocks of other listed companies.  
China’s stock market shows an interesting pattern in 2007, experiencing an 
abnormal increase in overall market index. The Shanghai Composite Index started at 
2675.47 on Dec 29th 2006 and ended at 5261.56 on Dec 31st 2007, an increase of 
almost 100% over the year. Before 2007, the average index was 1170. After 2007, it 
decreased from 5261.56 to 1958.53 [Figure 2.1]. Moreover, most of the listed 
companies in the A share market experienced an increase at the same time. 98.9% of 
the listed firms in the A share market had a price increase over 2007.  
These phenomena created a special market environment in which listed firms 
can realize large capital gains by buying and selling shares of other listed companies 
and expand their bottom-line earnings. In fact this is what many companies did in 
2007. Take the YOUNGOR GROUP, a listed company in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, for an example. It had an investment net income of RMB 34 million in 
2006, but the number for 2007 is 81 times that for 2006, reaching RMB 2.754 billion. 
This income is generated by selling its holdings in Citic Securities, another listed 
company in the Shanghai Stock Exchange during 2007. This investment net income 
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fell to 1.3 billion in the third quarter of 2008. The investment net income is equivalent 
to 3% of its total earnings in 2006, 75% in 2007 and 48% in 2008. 
It is interesting to study this phenomenon for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
abnormal increase and decrease in the overall stock market is unusual, historically. 
The abnormal capital gains or losses resulting from this market trend are unusual as 
well. Thus, it can be expected that such abnormal gains are very likely to be 
nonrecurring and firms that rely on such gains for their earnings will perform poorly 
once these gains disappear. It would be interesting to check whether this kind of firm 
actually has poor earnings performance in the next period. Secondly, it is interesting to 
see whether this nonrecurring gain is reflected in the stock price and whether people 
correctly understand the nature of the abnormal gains.  
The most relevant literature in the U.S. is the research work on special items. 
According to COMPUSTAT, special items represent unusual or nonrecurring items 
above taxes presented by the company, and this category includes sixteen types of 
different activities. One of the sixteen types in particular is the nonrecurring profit of 
securities. In the literature there are three main lines of research focusing on special 
items. One involves market reaction to announcements of special items. (Elliott and 
Shaw, 1988). 
All of these lines of research share a common problem and studying the 
phenomenon in China tackles that problem while contributing to the literature of the 
special item. The special item studied in the literature is either an aggregate concept or 
the write-off of assets due to data limitations. The data concerning the special item in 
COMPUSTAT aggregates all sixteen types of specific special items. Therefore, it 
poses a difficulty in terms of identifying data on individual types of special item and 
implies that each individual special item shares the same features as the average 
special item. The write-off of assets is one type of special item described in 
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COMPUSTAT and has been studied quite extensively, yet the literature does not go 
much beyond this type and studies concerning other types of special item continue to 
be absent. Studying the abnormal capital gains in China’s stock market in 2007 in fact 
focuses on Investment Net Income, an accounting item above net earnings in the 
income statement. This item consists primarily of capital gains from buying and 
selling securities, dividends, and interest, as well as profit from other firms invested. 
Thus, this item allows researchers to investigate companies’ approximate realized 
profits from securities in this special market condition. 
Moreover, in the literature, whether investors understand the nonrecurring 
nature of the special item and whether they are able to understand the information 
content contained in the recurring and nonrecurring items are unclear. Studying this 
phenomenon can not only contribute to the literature of the emerging market but also 
to the understanding of this question. Burgstabhler, Jiambalvo and Schevlin (2002) 
suggests that people overpriced the special item, and that the stock price does not fully 
reflect the information contained in the special item. Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman 
(2003) implies that the stock price fully reflects the information in the special item as 
if people correctly understand the special item. Lansman, Miller and Yeh (2006) finds 
that people underpriced the special item. Each finding above suggests a different 
answer to the market efficiency question. Thus, more empirical evidence is needed. 
The questions this paper attempts to answer are as follows: (1) What is the trend 
of the earnings components for firms that actively participated in the stock investment 
in 2007 and those that did not? (2) Do firms exhibit earnings reversals because of 
nonrecurring investment net income? (3) Is investment net income less persistent into 
future earnings than main operating income? (4) Does the stock price fully reflect the 
information contained in an item when the special market condition is present? (5) Do 
firms that rely on the investment net income have lower abnormal returns than firms 
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that rely on the main operating income? 
This paper finds that firms that actively participated in stock investment in 2007 
indeed relied on investment net income while those that did not participate relied on 
main operating income. In particular, in 2008 when the stock market was in decline, 
those that had actively participated in the stock investment in 2007 tended to rely on 
main operating income because investment net income declined significantly. When 
earnings components are examined over time, it is found that firms that participated in 
stock investment in 2007 had earnings reversals in 2008 because of the decline in 
investment net income. The above earnings reversal is also reflected in the earnings 
persistence analysis. It is found that investment net income is less persistent than main 
operating income into future earnings. The stock price also acts as if the investors 
correctly and fully understand the earnings persistence of these two different items 
together.  The return analysis shows that both kinds of firm on average had positive 
abnormal returns in 2007 and 2008. The abnormal returns of the firms that did not 
participate in the stock market in 2007 are higher than those of firms that participated, 
although statistical significance is not obtained.  
This paper contributes both to the literature on the special item and that on 
emerging markets. It provides empirical evidence for a new type of special item and 
confirms the literature’s findings on the aggregate special item. It demonstrates the 
nonrecurring nature of a new type of activity defined by the special item. It provides 
new evidence for the market efficiency question and approaches a new type of special 
item. The findings of this paper support the result of Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman 
(2003) regarding market efficiency. This paper will be useful to analysts and investors 
in bringing attention to this type of investment activity of firms and the need to be 
careful when reading financial statements and making investment decisions. The paper 
will be useful to policy-makers as well in calling for closer scrutiny to firms that 
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frequently engage in buying and selling stocks. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section I reviews related literature. 
Section II develops the hypothesis. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents 
results. Section V concludes and points toward possible future research.     
 
2.2 Literature review 
Prior studies on the special item focus primarily on the average special item. 
Lipe (1986) shows that earnings components explain more of the variation in returns 
than earnings itself. The earnings components provide additional information for 
future returns. This indicates that it is important to decompose earnings into 
components in a return study, and that the special item is likely to contribute to the 
variation of the stock return. Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn (1996) finds that special 
items provide information and have predictive power for future earnings. This 
indicates that the separation of the special item from the other operating items is 
meaningful in studying future earnings. This lays the foundation for this current paper 
to study the relation between a particular type of special item and future earnings and 
the future returns. Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin (2002) examines the extent to 
which information in the special item is contained in the stock price in the fourth 
quarter subsequent to an earnings announcement. The results show that the positive 
special item is transitory while the negative special item is not. Yet the special item in 
this finding is still the average special item and, thus, it does not indicate that the 
individual special item shares the same characteristics.    
Regarding the persistence of earnings components, Sloan (1996) provides 
important evidence of earnings components and guides the persistence study of this 
paper. Sloan (1996) extends the framework used by Freenman et al. (1982) to test the 
relation between current earnings components and future earnings. It finds that the 
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accrual component is less persistent than the cash flow component into future 
earnings. This paper adopts Sloan’s (1996) approach but decomposes earnings in a 
different way.    
The prior literature focuses more on one type of individual special item: the 
write-offs of assets. Elliott and Shaw (1988) studies 240 firms that reported large 
write-offs from 1982 to 1985. They find that these firms had declining earnings to 
assets and earnings to market value before announcements and had negative returns on 
average when the announcements were made. These findings indicate that the 
performance of those firms that reported large write-offs was not promising, and that 
reporting of write-offs can hide unpleasant accounting reports. Elliot and Hanna 
(1996) uses a longer period to study the characteristics of firms with multiple write-
offs over the years. They find firms that reported write-offs were more likely to report 
them in the future, and that the earnings response coefficient on these items tended to 
decrease as the frequency of write-off reports increased. This indicates the transitory 
nature of this item, particularly when it is reported frequently. Francis, Hanna and 
Vincent (1996) examines what factors are related to decisions to report write-offs and 
decisions of how much to report. They find that the historical security return, the 
book-to-market ratio and the return-on-asset ratio, whether there has been a recent 
change in management and whether the firm has reported write-offs in the past, can 
explain the decision to report write-offs. Seeing whether the transitory nature of the 
nonrecurring write-off item and the poor financial performance of these firms also 
exist in firms that have other types of special item is the goal of this paper.   
One question this paper tries to address is whether stock prices fully reflect the 
information content in investment net income. In the literature there has already been a 
fair amount of work on testing the information content in stock prices. One famous 
paper, Bernard and Thomas (1990), uses quarterly data to show that stock prices do 
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not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. A second 
classic paper, Sloan (1996), extends the findings of the above study by looking at 
earnings components. Sloan investigates the accrual and cash flow components and 
concludes that stock price does not fully reflect the information contained in these two 
components, such that people seem to underestimate the persistence of the cash flow 
component into the future and overestimate the persistent level of the accrual 
component. Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin (2002), using the same method but 
from another perspective of decomposing earnings studies the information contained 
in the special item and concludes that the stock price does not fully reflect the 
information in the special item. Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2004), on the other 
hand, finds that there is no statistical relation between the security return and the 
special item using a one-equation test. This poses an opposite conclusion and demands 
further investigation into the special item. The special item defined in Doyle, 
Lundholm and Soliman (2003) is also an average concept. Whether this conclusion 
applies to an individual type of special item requires more work and more detailed 
data. Lansman, Miller and Yeh (2006) suggests a third conclusion following Ohlson 
(1999)’s model. In contrast to the two findings above, the stock market underpriced 
the special item and overpriced the main operating income. The special item defined 
here is also an average concept. Which conclusion applies to the individual special 
item is one of the questions this paper explores.  
There is one study on investment net income in China’s stock market. Chen and 
Wang (2004) investigates the value relevance of operating income and the below-the-
line item, including investment net income, from 1997 to 2000. They find that 
investment net income was priced higher than main operating income by the stock 
market although investment net income was less persistent into future earnings than 
main operating income between 1997 and 2000. In contrast to Chen and Wang (2004), 
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the intention of this paper goes beyond studying value-relevance. This paper tries to 
study the phenomenon that listed firms take advantage of a booming stock market in 
order to exaggerate their earnings performance and suffer from the declining stock 
market in the following year when the market is down. Unlike Chen and Wang (2004), 
which studies all firms, this paper compares those that invested in the stock market in 
2007 to those that did not.   
There is also research on stock investment activities in 2007. Yu and Wang 
(2008) investigates the question of what drives the decision to cross-hold listed 
companies. They find that liquidity and ability to pay back debt are negatively related 
to cross-shareholding decisions. Their paper focuses on listed firms that mutually 
invest in each other’s stocks and the motivation behind such cross-shareholding.  
This paper, however, addresses a broader group of firms. As long as a listed firm 
invests in another listed firm, it is the object of this study, and firms do not have to 
have mutual investment. This paper also explores a different question: whether this 
group of firms has earnings reversals because of stock investment and whether the 
stock market reflects this earnings persistence.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis and method 
It is expected that for firms that actively participated in stock market investment, 
total operating earnings, which include both main operating earnings and investment 
net income, decreased significantly in 2008, and the cause of this decline is the 
significant decrease in investment net income. In contrast, firms that did not actively 
participate in stock market investment did not have an earnings reversal in 2008 or, if 
they did, it was not because of the decline in investment net income. For simplicity, in 
the rest of this paper, firms that actively participated in the stock market investment in 
2007 are referred to as bad firms, and other firms are referred to as good firms. To 
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highlight the 2008 earnings decline, it is expected that the bad firms had significant 
increases in total operating earnings in 2007, and this is because of the significant 
increase in investment net income in 2007. In contrast, the good firms did not have 
significant increases in investment net income which led to significant increases in 
total operating income. Thus the first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1 (a): bad firms have a significant increase in investment net income, which 
leads to a significant increase in total operating income for 2007, while good firms do 
not have significant increases in investment net income leading to a significant 
increase in the total operating income for 2007. 
H1 (b): bad firms have a significant decrease in investment net income, which 
leads to a significant decrease in total operating income for 2008, while good firms do 
not have a significant decline in investment net income contributing to a decrease in 
total operating income for 2008. 
In order to test whether main operating earnings or investment net income or the 
net earnings increase significantly, the signed test is used in this paper. The signed test 
is a non-parametric equivalent version of the one sample t-test, when the sample is not 
distributed normally. Since the sign rank test is more statistically powerful in general 
than the sign test, which is another non-parametric equivalent test, the sign rank test is 
adopted here.  
It is expected that the bad group’s investment net income growth in 2007 should 
be higher than that of the good group in 2007. This is because the bad group’s firms 
rely quite heavily on gains from investment net income and, in 2007, the stock market 
was booming, which produced a favorable environment for generating positive 
investment net income. As a result, those that participated in stock market investment 
would benefit from this booming market in 2007. It is also expected that the growth of 
investment net income for the bad group in 2008 is smaller than that for the good 
32
group. This is because the stock market declined in 2008. As a result, opportunities for 
generating investment net income from the stock market disappeared, and, by contrast, 
investment net income had a negative influence on total operating earnings in 2008. 
Those bad firms that relied on investment net income in 2007 would have a greater 
decline in the investment income in 2008 than the good firms. The second hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H1: Main operating income is the key driving force of a company’s growth 
because it is recurring and persistent. In contrast, investment net income that includes 
the capital gains from stock market investment, particularly when the stock market 
experiences booming and declining, is relatively less persistent and nonrecurring. 
Therefore, main operating income and investment net income have different 
implication for future earnings.  
H2: Main operating income should be more persistent into future earnings than 
investment net income.   
Following Freeman et al. (1982), the above idea can be tested with the equation 
below : 
Earningst+1 = b + bopa*operating incomet + bia*inv incomet + vt+1 
“Earnings” is net earnings scaled by the average total asset. “Operating income” 
is defined as the main operating income scaled by the average total assets. “Inv 
income” is investment net income excluding profits from invested companies scaled 
by total assets. The coefficient “bopa” measures the persistence of the main operating 
income into future earnings. The coefficient “bia” represents the persistence of 
investment net income into future earnings. Following the above analysis, bopa should 
be greater than bia.  
Mishkin’s test is replicated to investigate how the stock market interprets the 
implications of main operating income and investment net income. Mishkin (1983) 
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proposes a framework to test the rational expectation hypothesis in macroeconomics. 
Sloan (1996) introduces this test to accounting studies to address whether stock price 
fully reflects the smaller persistence of accruals and the larger persistence of cash 
flow. This paper parallels this approach and asks if stock price fully reflects the 
smaller persistence of investment net income and the higher persistence of main 
operating income.  
H3: The market is efficient in the sense that stock prices fully reflect earnings 
implications for future earnings.  
Specifically, the following two regressions are estimated jointly: 
     Earningst+1 = b + bopa*operating incomet + bia*inv incomet + vt+1 
     AdjrRt+1 = a + β*( Earningst+1-b-bop*operating incomet -bi*inv incomet) + εt+1 
The first equation shows actual earnings components’ contributions to future 
earnings based on actual earnings information. It describes how current earnings 
components information can predict future earnings based on actual future earnings 
information. The second equation observes how stock prices represented by stock 
returns reflect information in current earnings for future earnings. The logic of the 
second regression is that investors have an understanding of earnings information. If 
their understanding of earnings information is exactly the same as the actual earnings 
implications, then an abnormal return is obtained in the case of an earnings surprise. If 
the investors do not understand earnings components correctly, an abnormal return 
will not only be due to the earnings surprise, but also to mispricing. According to the 
Sloan’s (1996) presentation of this model, market efficiency imposes two constraints: 
bopa = bop and bia = bi. These two constraints require that the stock market 
understands the information in the earnings components correctly and exactly. In 
particular, bop is expected to be smaller than bi. If it is not, the stock price seems to 
act as if investors do not distinguish between these two components.  
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The two equations are estimated as a system which uses iterative weighted non-
linear least squares. The statistic used is the likelihood ratio statistic and is distributed 
asymptotically χ2(q). The statistic is as follows: 
2nlog(SSRc/SSRu) 
Where  
n = the number of observations 
q = the number of constrains imposed by the market efficiency 
SSRc=the sum of squared residuals from the constrained weighted system 
SSRu=the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained weighted system 
In other words, H3 can be written as bopa = bop and bia = bi. 
The above test investigates whether a stock price acts as if investors distinguish 
information in main operating income and investment net income. In other words, it 
helps to observe whether investors distinguish between firms that rely heavily on 
investment net income and firms that rely heavily on main operating income. It is 
expected that, if investors do not distinguish between these two groups of firms, bad 
firms’ stock price will appreciate more than good firms’ when the stock market is 
booming and decline to a greater extent than that of good firms when the stock market 
is declining. Thus the following is the fifth hypothesis. 
H4: If investors do not distinguish between good firms and bad firms, then the 
bad firms should have higher adjusted returns in 2007 than good firms, and lower 
adjusted returns in 2008 than good firms. 
This hypothesis is tested using the following regression approach. 
Adjrt+1 = a + a1*groupt + a2*industry + a3*sizet + vt+1 
This is a cross-sectional approach. “Group” indicates which group the firm 
belongs to. If its group is 1, that means it is a good firm. a1 represents whether a good 
firm has statistically higher adjusted returns than a bad firm with the same size and in 
35
the same industry. The above regression is run year by year to test H5. It is expected 
that a1 is smaller than 0 in 2007 and greater than 0 in 2008. 
 
2.4 Data Description 
     To begin the test, firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 are 
selected to form a sample. The 2007 financial annual report of each listed firm on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange has been read in order to find out which company took part 
in stock investment in 2007 and which did not. Those that reported stock selling and 
buying in the 2007 annual financial report are selected and labeled as bad firms. Those 
that did not report such information and whose investment net income did not contain 
any record of net gains from tradable financial assets or from financial assets that were 
potentially for sale are selected and labeled as good firms. There are also firms whose 
information does not present a clear picture of whether they participated in stock 
market investment in 2007 or not. Firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are 
thus divided into three groups: the bad group, the good group and the unclear group. 
Next, firms in the good group are matched with those in the bad group. Industry 
is used as a first criterion to match firms. The industry definition is based on the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, and this paper uses the more detailed 
definition. Then, size is used as a second criterion to match further. Within the list of 
good firms in the same industry, a bad firm is matched with a good firm whose total 
market capitalization is within a +/- 20% range of the bad group’s size and the good 
firm with the closest size in range is the matched good firm for this bad firm. As a 
result, a list of bad firms and a list of corresponding good firms are selected for the 
study. 
Variables needed for the study consist of two groups, one of which is stock 
price. The abnormal adjusted return here uses the close price at the end of the annual 
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report announcement date of a company and the close price one year later to calculate 
the cumulative raw return. In order to control for the market effect, the Shanghai 
Composite Index is used for adjustment. For each company, the corresponding 
adjustment uses the index at the announcement date of that company and the index 
one year after that date. So if companies have different announcement dates, the 
adjustment is different. The motivation for the period is that each company’s returns 
should be adjusted by the market index in the same period as the company’s period for 
calculating returns. All stock prices used are adjusted for stock split and dividends 
before calculating the return. As one-year returns are examined here, announcement 
dates for the annual report of 2006 and 2007 for each firm in the sample are obtained 
and stock prices for these firms at the corresponding dates in 2006, 2007 and 2008 are 
obtained next. Then, the corresponding Shanghai Composite Index is obtained as a last 
step to allow calculation of adjusted returns. As a result, adjusted returns are for the 
year 2007 and the year 2008 to test whether information for 2006 and in 2007 is 
correctly reflected in the stock price.   
The other group of variables is accounting information. In the income statement 
for each annual report, the main operating activities’ revenue and the main operating 
activities’ costs are listed. The difference between these two gives the profit from 
main operating activities. The income statement also lists an item called investment 
net income, which includes capital gains from stock investments and a separate item 
called profit from other invested companies. This item is also a component of 
investment net income and the difference between these two makes the data more 
approximate to the capital gains from stock investment. The income statement also 
lists an item called operating profit. It is a summation of the profits from main 
operating activities, investment net income and other components. Additionally, net 
earnings, which are a summation of operating profits and profits from non-operating 
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activities, are also listed in the income statement. To compare firms that actively 
participated in stock investment and those that did not, each accounting variable used 
is scaled by the total assets of the current year. To be more specific, the following 
shows how this paper defines the variables used for its analysis: 
     Op per asset=(operating activities’ revenue-operating activities cost)/total assets 
     Inv per asset = (investment net income- profit from invested firms)/total assets 
     Opinv per asset = operating profit/ total assets 
     Np per asset = net profit/ total asset 
The above variables are used to examine the earnings components of each firm 
and the trend of the earnings components since 2006. As this analysis intends to 
compare two groups of firms, the above variable is obtained for each firm in each year 
and then within each group, and each variable is averaged to get an average 
observation for a group in a year.   
In order to test whether there is an earnings reversal, the following variables are 
used: growth rate of main operating profit, growth rate of investment net income 
excluding profit from other companies, and growth rate of operating income. If the 
growth rate of the accounting variable is positive in one year and negative in the 
following year, the reversal argument is proven.  
Following the literature to execute Mishkin’s test (1983), the accounting 
variables are standardized in another way. For net earnings, main operating profit and 
investment net income are scaled by average total assets for the current year and 
previous year. The test uses annual accounting information for 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
Below are definitions for the variables used in the Mishkin’s test. 
Earnings t = net earnings t /[0.5*(total asset t-1 + total asset t )] 
Operating income t = profit from main operating activities t /[0.5*(total asset t-1 + total 
asset t] 
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Inv income t = investment net income excluding profit from other companies t 
/[0.5*(total asset t-1 + total asset t] 
When testing whether the return for one group is higher than that for the other 
based on the regression, industry and market capitalization are employed. Industry is 
defined by China’s Securities Regulatory Commission. These definitions have both 
broad and detailed versions. Here the detailed versions are used. Market capitalization 
is total market value at the end of the calendar year.   
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
The two groups of firms have exhibited different earnings composition patterns 
since 2006. Figure 2.2 presents each group separately. Figure 2.2-a shows the 
characteristics of the good firms group. In 2006 and 2007, on average the good 
group’s net earnings relied on main operating activities. While investment net income 
excluding profit from other companies also contributed to net earnings in these two 
years, this contribution was not dominant. In 2008, although this group’s main 
operating earnings declined, they still played a more important role in terms of net 
earnings than investment net income. A possible reason that main operating income 
decreased is the economic decline in 2008. Additionally, the accounting variables are 
standardized by current-year total assets. The total assets contain items whose value 
varies with market value. The stock market in 2008 declined, as well, and this affected 
total assets. From the graph it can be inferred that main operating earnings declined to 
a greater extent than total assets. This lead to the decline of main operating per asset 
and the relative unchanged net earnings per asset in 2008 in Figure 2.2-a. On the other 
hand, Figure 2.2-b shows a contrasting pattern for the bad firms group. In 2006, main 
operating income and investment net income played almost equally important roles in 
net earnings. In 2007, net earnings were mainly from investment net income. In 2008, 
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both investment net income and the net earnings declined. Following the same logic 
explained above, investment net income and net earnings declined to a greater extent 
than total assets, which leads to the graph. In 2008, for the bad firms group, main 
operating earnings became the driving force for net earnings. This might be due to the 
sharp decline in investment net income or to total assets changing to a greater extent 
than main operating earnings for the bad group. In a sentence, Figure 2.2 demonstrates 
that the good group relies on main operating activities over time while the bad group 
relied on investment net income in 2007. The message is that those that bought and 
sold securities in 2007 actively explored the good market condition in 2007. 
Figure 2.3 consisting of four graphs which demonstrate the reason for earnings 
reversals for the group of bad firms. Figure 2.3-a shows that the good group’s main 
operating income per asset increased on average from 2006 to 2007, but decreased in 
2008 compared to that for the bad group. Figure 2.3-b shows that the good group’s 
investment net income increased in 2007 and 2008, while the bad group’s investment 
net income increased dramatically in 2007 and decreased dramatically in 2008. Based 
on Figures 2. 3-c and 3-d, it can be seen that the bad group’s operating earnings and 
net earnings decreased in 2008 while the good group’s operating earnings and net 
earnings remained approximately unchanged. Combining the four figures in Figure 
2.3, it can be inferred that the bad group’s declining investment net income contributes 
to the decline of its net earnings. The good group’s decline in terms of main operating 
earnings and the increase in investment net income explain the relatively unchanged 
net earnings of the good group. These four figures confirm the two-sided nature of 
buying and selling securities. Doing so helps bad firms expand their net earnings in the 
bull market and disguises bad firms as good firms; however, once a bear market 
comes, bad firms’ poor performance will be revealed. In contrast, good firms that rely 
on core operating activities can stand the test of the movement of the stock market.  
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In order to test whether the above preliminary results are meaningful 
statistically, Table 2.2 presents formal statistics. Table 2.2-2007 shows results for 
2007. Column 4 gives the mean of the growth rate of operating income per asset, the 
growth rate of investment net income per asset and the growth rate of total operating 
income per asset. For each accounting variable, the first line is for the bad group and 
the second line is for the good group. The nonparametric tests of each group of 
observations for each variable show that the growth rates for investment net income 
for the bad group is statistically significant; the growth rates for the total operating 
income for both groups are statistically significant. This indicates that both groups had 
earnings increases in 2007, and, for the bad group, this was due to the increase in 
investment net income. 
    Table 2.2-2008 shows the results for 2008. Similarly, the means are the average 
growth rate of the accounting variable for one group. Based on the nonparametric test, 
the growth rates for the main operating income for both groups are not statistically 
different from zero; the growth rate of the investment net income for the good group is 
not statistically different from zero, but that for the bad group is statistically smaller 
than zero. Consistently, the growth rate of the total operating income for the bad group 
is statistically different from zero and that for the good group is not.  
In Figure 2.3 it is shown that the bad group’s earnings decline in 2008 was due 
to the decline in investment net income, and this is shown to be statistically 
significant. Moreover, based on Table 2.2 of both 2007 and 2008, it can be inferred 
that earnings from investment net income are nonrecurring. Bad firms manage to boost 
their earnings with investment net income. As this portion of total earnings disappears 
in 2008, net earnings decline, as well.  
Whether people can understand the nonrecurring nature of investment net 
income can be inferred from Mishkin’s test. Sloan (1996) employs Mishkin’s test to 
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address whether stock prices act as if people can understand the less persistent nature 
of accrual and the more persistent nature of cash flow. I follow Sloan’s approach and 
use Mishkin’s test to investigate the stock price implication of investment net income 
and infer people’s understanding of this item. The idea is that the actual accounting 
information for current and future periods can tell whether investment net income 
persists into future earnings while stock price can reflect investors’ expectations of 
persistence. If a stock price acts as if investors’ perception is the same as actual 
persistence, an abnormal return is due to an earnings surprise; if the stock price acts as 
if investors misunderstand the persistence level, the abnormal return is not only due to 
an earnings surprise, but also to market misperception.  
Table 2.3 presents the actual persistence of earnings components into future 
earnings. Here, earnings components refer to main operating income and investment 
net income excluding profits from other firms. Net earnings also consist of other 
components, yet they are not of interest for this paper. Here I only observe the effect 
of these two main items. The first column shows the result based on raw data. It 
indicates that the earnings response coefficient is 0.28 for main operating income and 
0.08 for investment net income. The main operating income’s persistence is 
statistically greater than zero while that for investment net income is not. One dollar of 
this year’s main operating income indicates that 28 cents will persist next year. The 
literature says that the earnings response coefficient should be between 0 and 1. Table 
2.3 shows that both coefficients for main operating income and investment net income 
are smaller than 1. In addition, based on the t-test, it is not proven that the coefficient 
for main operating income is greater than that for investment net income. In order to 
highlight the persistence of main operating income, I also present the persistence of 
net earnings. The second column shows that the coefficient is 0.24, and that it is 
statistically greater than zero.  
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Table 2.3 column 3 and column 4 are based on the rank data. In contrast to the 
raw data, the data for each variable is sorted and grouped into ten deciles. Using rank 
can control for the outlier effect. Column 3 shows that both main operating income 
and investment net income have significant persistence into the future. Unlike the 
result for the raw data, the earnings coefficient for main operating income is 0.5, and 
that for investment net income is 0.18. Both are much higher than those in column 
one. The coefficients are proved to be statistically smaller than 1 and, more 
importantly, main operating income is shown to be more persistent than investment 
net income. Moreover, adjusted R2 for column 3 is 0.26, which is much higher than 
the adjusted R2 in column 2. Similarly, the regression testing the persistence of net 
earnings based on the rank data in column 4 is more reliable than that in column 2 
with raw data. Adjusted R2 0.39 is higher than that in column 2. The coefficient is 
0.62, indicating that a large portion of current earnings can persist into future earnings, 
and it is statistically greater than zero and smaller than one. Table 2.3 shows that both 
operating income and investment net income persist into the future and that 
investment net income is less persistent than operating income. It proves that the 
literature’s findings for the average special item can extend to profits for securities. 
Table 2.4. presents the results of replicating Mishkin’s test. This test helps 
reveal whether a stock price reflects actual earnings persistence. Panel A shows how 
stock price acts in terms of reflecting the persistence of earnings components. The 
coefficients of interest are bopa and bia in equation (1) and bop and bi in equation (2). 
Bopa and bia are actual persistence and bop and bi are estimated persistence. The 
coefficients show that the stock market expects the persistence of main operating 
income to be 0.14 and that of the investment net income to be 0.21. Furthermore, 
although the two equations are estimated jointly, the coefficients obtained from 
Equation (1) are the same as the equation estimated by itself.  
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This conclusion is obtained based on Table 2.4 Panel B which presents whether 
above actual earnings persistence and market expectations of earnings persistence are 
statistically different from each other. If they are not statically different from each 
other, that means that the market’s expectation is the same as the actual persistence. If 
the two are statistically different, that indicates that the market either overvalues or 
undervalues the item’s persistence. The results show that the likelihood ratio statistic 
is not very high, and it can be said that the market correctly understands the two items 
jointly. The Mishkin’s test above provides a way to examine whether the market 
differentiates between main operating income and investment net income. To interpret 
this from another perspective, it helps to examine whether the market differentiates the 
group of good firms from the group of bad firms described in this paper. This can be 
summarized as the stock price acts as if people understood the implications of main 
operating income and investment net income at the same time, and that people can 
distinguish bad firms from good firms based on accounting information. 
The following results intend to verify the above conclusion: that stock price 
correctly anticipates the earnings persistence of each component. It is hypothesized 
that if people do not understand the nonrecurring nature of investment net income, the 
group of bad firms will be priced higher than it should be and the adjusted return from 
the bad firms will be higher than that for the good firms in 2007 when the stock 
market was booming and lower in 2008 when the stock market declined. However, in 
a simple graph in Figure 2.4, it is shown that people seem to correctly understand the 
bad firms and good firms. The adjusted return from the bad firms is lower than that of 
the good firms for 2007, which cannot show that investors overvalued the bad firms in 
2007, and it is consistent with the results in Table 2.4. In 2008, the return for the bad 
firms is still lower than that for the good firms. To test whether the bad firms gained 
statistically higher returns in 2007 than the good firms, and lower returns in 2008, a 
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cross-sectional regression is conducted. Table 2.6 presents the results. Column 1 and 
column 3 are based on the raw data and the other two columns are based on the rank 
data to control for the outlier effect. If the group is 1, this indicates that the firm is in 
the good group. Column 1 shows that the good firm’s returns are not statistically lower 
than those for the bad firms in 2007. Column 2 indicates that the results are robust 
based on the rank data. Column 3 and column 4 show that the adjusted returns for the 
good firms are not statistically higher than those for the bad firms. In other words, the 
regression result is consistent with the graph and the statistical test in the sense that the 
returns for the good firms is higher than the returns for the bad firms, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. This result again does not provide strong 
evidence against the conclusion that people seem to understand the information in bad 
firms and good firms.  Additionally, from Table 2.6, size consistently affects the 
adjusted returns based on this sample. The larger the firm, the smaller the return it 
generates.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper studies a group of 80 firms that actively participated in the stock 
investment in 2007 when the market was booming. In order to make a comparison, the 
paper uses another group of 80 firms that did not participate in stock market 
investment in 2007 as a control group. The study focuses on the period of 2006-2008.  
Firstly, the characteristics of the earnings components are compared between 
these two groups in three recent years. The group of bad firms is proved to rely 
heavily on investment net income in 2007, and this reliance failed to help boost net 
earnings for 2008 because the stock market declined in 2008. In contrast, the good 
group consistently relied heavily on main operating income.  
Secondly, it is shown that the earnings reversed statistically significantly for the 
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bad group and this was due to the statistically significant decline in investment net 
income. On the other hand, the earnings of the good group did not change significantly 
and neither the good group’s main operating income nor investment income changed 
significantly. 
Thirdly, earnings persistence and whether the stock market reflects the 
implication of the accounting information have been studied. It is found that both main 
operating income and investment net income persist into future earnings and that main 
operating income is more persistent than investment net income. The stock market acts 
as if investors correctly understand the implications of main operating income and 
investment net income at the same time.  
Fourthly, the market adjusted return is used to further check whether the market 
correctly prices the good group and the bad group. The results show that returns for 
the good group are higher than that for the bad group in 2007 and 2008, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. This at least does not provide strong evidence 
against the idea that the market correctly prices the two groups of firms and 
understands the implications of the nonrecurring item.  
By taking the advantage of the special stock market conditions in 2007 in China, 
this paper verifies the nonrecurring nature of a new type of special item and confirms 
that the less persistence feature of the average special item also exists in profits from 
securities. It also provides new evidence for the mixing literature on people’s 
perceptions of the special item. The findings in this paper agree with Doyle, Lundholm 
and Soliman’s (2003) observation that people seem to correctly understand the 
implications of the nonrecurring accounting item. More importantly, the paper helps to 
gain a better understanding of the financial market and investors’ behavior in the 
emerging market and contributes to the literature on the emerging market.  
 
46
APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The IPO cycle from 1970 to 2008 
The following graph shows the monthly IPO volume from 1970 to 2008. The volume 
is represented by the number of newly issued firms each month during these years. 
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Figure 1.2: The IPO/GDP and the GDP growth 
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Figure 2.1: Shanghai Composite Index 
The Shanghai Composite Index is created by the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It includes 
all of the listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The index starts from Dec.19th 
1990 and is a weighted average of the stock prices of all of the listed firms. Below is 
the trend of the index from 1990 to 2008. 
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Figure 2.2 a.: Earnings components of two different groups of firms in 2006, 2007 and 
2008. 
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Figure 2.2 (Continued) b. 
To simplify the explanation, the group of firms that rely heavily on stock transactions 
in 2007 is called the bad group and the other is called the good group. The first graph 
shows annual average net earnings components for the good group in 2006, 2007 and 
2008. The second graph shows the same for the bad group. In each graph for each year, 
the first bar represents average main operating income. The second bar represents 
average investment net income excluding profits from investing in other firms. The 
third bar represents average total operating income, which includes both main 
operating income and investment net income. The fourth bar represents average net 
earnings. All of the accounting variables are standardized by total assets in the current 
year. op per asset is (operating activities’ revenue- operating activities cost)/total 
assets; inv per asset is (investment net income- profit from the invested firms)/total 
assets; opinv per asset is operating profit/ total assets; np per asset is net profit/ total 
assets. 
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Figure 2.3: Earnings components trend of two different groups of firms 
 
a. average main operating income/asset     
 
 
 
b. average investment net income/asset 
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Figure 2.3 (Continued) 
 
c. average total operating income/asset 
 
 
 
d. average net earnings/asset 
 
To simplify the explanation, the group of firms that rely heavily on stock transactions 
in 2007 is called the bad group and the other is called the good group. The graph a 
shows average operating income per asset from 2006 to 2008 for both groups. Graph b 
shows average investment net income per asset from 2006 to 2008 for both groups. 
The graph c shows average total operating income per asset from 2006 to 2008 for 
both groups. Graph d shows average net earnings from 2006 to 2008 for both groups. 
Each variable mentioned above is the average of the data for all of the firms. All of the 
accounting variables are standardized by total assets in the current year. op per asset is 
(operating activities’ revenue- operating activities cost)/total assets; inv per asset is 
(investment net income- profits from invested firms)/total assets; opinv per asset is 
operating profit/ total assets; np per asset is net profit/ total assets. 
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Figure 2.4: Adjusted returns of two groups of firms in 2007 and 2008 
 
Good firms are defined as those firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange that did 
not participate in stock investment in 2007. Bad firms are defined as those listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange that participated in stock investment in 2007. The 
adjusted return is calculated as the raw return minus the market return of the Shanghai 
Composite Index. The raw return is based on the close price at the end of the 
announcement date and the close price one year later. The adjusted return is calculated 
for each listed firm first and then the average of the return of all of the firms is 
obtained. The adjusted return in the graph is the average adjusted return.  
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
The number of observations, minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of 
the variables used in this paper, are presented in the following table. The last two 
columns describe the source of the data for each variable, and the time frequency of 
the data. Variables are divided into four groups. The first is variables for aggregate 
IPO activities. The second is the proxy for the timing hypothesis. The third and the 
fourth are proxies for the moral hazard. The third presents the financial health of IPO 
firms. The fourth represents the bankruptcy situation of IPO firms in the economy. 
 
Variables N MIN MAX MEAN STD Source  Time  
IPO_GDP 467 0.000894  0.0302  0.0101  0.0052  
Fed/BEA  1970-2008(m/Q)  
IPO_CPI 467 3.2906  150.2204  39.36495  26.02411  Fed/BLS  
1970-
2008(m/m)  
IPON 468 0 108 27.6 23.3 SDC 
1970-
2008(m) 
delnspx 468 -0.4715  0.2525  0.0346  0.099  Datastream  
1970-
2008(m)  
Current 152  2.0636  4.9454  3.4012  0.6902  
Compustat  1970-2008(Q)  Quick 152  0.6293  4.5767  2.6890  0.8984  
Cash 127  0.0423  0.2627  0.1249  0.0395  
Mba 155 0.68 130.38 6.94 13.73 
  Compustat 1970-2008(Q) 
Mbe 155 -5.44 80.74 3.54 6.93 
Ep 155 -234.298 4.73 -1.71 18.85 
Ceppe 112 0.052 0.98 0.24 0.16 
Banksim_GDP 468 0.0013 0.0225 0.010679 0.0057 
Administrative 
Office of the 
U.S. Courts; 
American 
Bankruptcy 
Institute  
1970-
1979(y) 
1980-
1990(Q) 
1991-
2003/3(m) 
2003/4-
2008/12(Q) 
 
Banksim_CPI 468 6.82 78.04 34.655 14.7 
Bankint_GDP 468 0.0013 0.0225 0.010686 0.00573 
Bankint_CPI 468 6.83 77.83 34.668 14.59 
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Table 1.2: The correlation between the business cycle and the financial health of 
companies 
The Pearson correlation coefficient is presented in this table. In each cell, the first row 
is the correlation coefficient between the two variables related to the cell. The second 
row is the probability that the two variables are not correlated. The third row is the 
number of non-missing values. 
 
  GDP Current Quick Cash 
GDP 
 
 
1.0000 
 
155 
 
   
Current 
  
 
0.5998 
<.0001 
152 
 
1.0000 
 
152 
 
  
Quick 
  
 
0.7290 
<.0001 
152 
 
0.9416 
<.0001 
152 
 
1.0000 
 
152 
 
 
Cash 
  
 
0.7573 
<.0001 
152 
 
0.9472 
<.0001 
152 
 
0.9873 
<.0001 
152 
 
1.00000 
 
152 
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Table 1.3: The effect of moral hazard proxied by accounting measures on the 
aggregate IPO activities. 
(I). The result is based on Current ratio as a proxy. 
The independent variables are Current and Delnspx. Current is defined as current 
assets divided by current liabilities and it is the average of Current for each firm in that 
quarter. Delnspx is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) minus its one-year moving average. 
The dependent variables are IPO_GDP, IPO_CPI and LNIPON. IPO_GDP is the total 
equity issued per month divided by GDP(current dollars and seasonally adjusted). 
IPO_CPI is the total equity issued divided by seasonally adjusted CPI. LNIPON is the 
natural log of the monthly number of IPOsThe table reports the coefficient, the 
Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2 and the number of 
observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance is represented by 
***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance 
is represented by *. 
 
 I 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON 
Constant 0.00122 -18.437** 0.2636 
 (0.00142) (6.7307) (0.4662) 
Current 0.00244*** 16.5441*** 0.71448*** 
 (0.00045) (2.2097) (0.1315) 
Delnspx 0.01628*** 44.6839** 4.65376*** 
 (0.00283) (16.5032) (0.7538) 
Adjr R2 0.2108 0.2388 0.3576 
Obs 455 455 438 
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Table 1.3 (Continued) 
(II) .The result is based on the cash ratio as a proxy. 
The dependent variables and Delnspx are the same as those in the above table. The 
independent variable is Cash defined as cash divided by current liabilities. Similarly, it 
is the average of each individual firm’s Cash.The table reports the coefficient, the 
Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2 and the number of 
observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance is represented by 
***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance 
is represented by *. 
 
 II 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON 
Constant 0.006*** 10.65942*** 1.64915*** 
 (0.0006) (2.0821) (0.2297) 
Cash 0.00197*** 15.33103*** 0.58131*** 
 (0.00037) (1.5891) (0.1106) 
Delnspx 0.01694*** 47.1991** 4.94962*** 
 (0.00273) (14.4751) (0.6945) 
Adjr R2 0.2176 0.3156 0.3682 
Obs 455 455 438 
 
58
Table 1.3 (Continued) 
(III) .The result is based on the quick ratio as a proxy. 
The dependent variables and Delnspx are the same as those in the previous table and 
the independent variable is Quick defined as (current assets-inventory) divided by 
current liabilities. Months in the same quarter have the same ratio in that quarter and 
the Quick is the average of the Quick of each individual firm in that quarter. The table 
reports the coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the 
adjusted R2 and the number of observations used in each regression. The 1% level of 
significance is represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. 
The 10% level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 III 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON 
Constant 0.00459*** -0.86681 1.26318** 
 (0.00098) (3.6459) (0.3359) 
Quick 0.001816*** 14.2951*** 0.525468*** 
 (0.00038) (1.6011) (0.1111) 
Delnspx 0.0175*** 51.2334** 5.05704*** 
 (0.00276) (14.924) (0.7006) 
Adjr R2 0.2059 0.2933 0.342 
Obs 455 455 438 
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Table 1.4: The effect of moral hazard proxied by bankruptcy records on the aggregate 
IPO. 
(I) The independent variable is Delnspx and Banksimg or Banksimc. Delnspx is 
ln(monthly S&P 500 index) deducted by its one-year moving average. Banksimg is 
monthly business bankruptcy filings divided by seasonally adjusted GDP, Banksimc is 
monthly business bankruptcy filings divided by seasonally adjusted CPI. As 
bankruptcy data from 1970 to 2003 is not monthly, a simple average is used to obtain 
the monthly data. The dependent variables are IPO_GDP, IPO_CPI and LNIPON. 
IPO_GDP is the total equity issued per month divided by GDP(current dollars and 
seasonally adjusted). IPO_CPI is the total equity issued divided by seasonally adjusted 
CPI. LNIPON is the natural log of the monthly number of IPOs. In group II, 
dependent variables and Delnspx are the same as those in group I. The independent 
variable is Bankintg or Banksintc. These are the same as those in group I, except that 
linear interpolation is used to obtain the monthly data. The table reports the 
coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2 and 
the number of observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance is 
represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level 
of significance is represented by *. 
 
 I 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON LNIPON 
Constant 0.01234*** 66.3947*** 3.1033*** 2.8951*** 
 (0.000706) (4.5666) (0.1294) (0.1436) 
Banksimg -0.26776***  -37.998**  
 (0.0548)  (13.9064)  
Banksimc  -0.8631***  -0.00537 
  (0.1177)  (0.00463) 
Delnspx 0.018938*** 82.2641*** 5.2912*** 5.14096*** 
 (0.00272) (14.3726) (0.7284) (0.731) 
Adjr R2 0.1868 0.2736 0.2035 0.1691 
Obs 467 467 447 447 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
(II) The dependent variables and Delnspx are the same as those in the above table. The 
independent variable is Bankintg or Banksintc. These are the same as those in group I, 
except that linear interpolation is used to obtain the monthly data. The table reports the 
coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2 and 
the number of observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance is 
represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level 
of significance is represented by *. 
 
 II 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON LNIPON 
Constant 0.01233*** 66.64781*** 3.1043*** 2.893415*** 
 (0.00071) (4.5942) (0.1302) (0.1442) 
Bankintg -0.26675***  -38.0876**  
 (0.055)  (14.0126)  
Bankintc  -0.8689***  -0.00532 
  (0.1183)  (0.00467) 
Delnspx 0.018743*** 80.9127*** 5.2848*** 5.13689*** 
 (0.00272) (14.2458) (0.7282) (0.7312) 
Adjr R2 0.1856 0.2741 0.2033 0.169 
Obs 467 467 447 447 
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Table 1.5: The effect of financial health in the past on the aggregate IPO activities 
The table below is based on monthly data from 1970 to 2008 and tests the effect of the 
lagged variable on aggregate IPO activities. The dependent variable is IPO_GDP. 
IPO_GDP is the total equity issued per month divided by GDP (current dollars and 
seasonally adjusted). The independent variables are Delnspx, Current and its lags. 
Delnspx is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) deducted by its one-year moving average. 
Current is defined as current assets divided by current liabilities and is the average of 
Current for each firm in that quarter. As Current is a ratio and obtained in quarters, the 
Current for each month in the same quarter is the same as the Current in the quarter. 
The lags are lagged by one month, two months, three months, and six months. This 
table reports the coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the 
adjusted R2 and the number of observations used in each regression. The 1% level of 
significance is represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. 
The 10% level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP 
Constant 0.00122 0.000763 0.000926 0.001935** 0.00157 
 (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00138) (0.00142) (0.00154) 
Current t 0.00244***     
 (0.00045)     
Current t-1  0.002587***    
  (0.000447)    
Current t-2   0.002544***   
   (0.000435)   
Current t-3    0.00224***  
    (0.000436)  
Current t-6     0.002364*** 
     (0.000478) 
Delnspxt 0.01628*** 0.015993*** 0.015991*** 0.01684*** 0.016651*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00301) (0.00307) (0.00289) (0.0029) 
Adjr R2 0.2108 0.2132 0.2037 0.1850 0.1943 
Obs 455 455 455 455 452 
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Table 1.6: The effect of the past bankruptcy record on the aggregate IPO activities 
The table below is based on monthly data from 1970 to 2008 and tests the effect of the 
lagged variable on aggregate IPO activities. The dependent variable is IPO_GDP. 
IPO_GDP is the total equity issued per month divided by GDP(current dollars and 
seasonally adjusted). The independent variables are Delnspx, Current and its lags. 
Delnspx is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) deducted by its one-year moving average. 
Banksimg is the monthly business bankruptcy filings divided by seasonally adjusted 
GDP. As the bankruptcy data from 1970 to 2003 is not monthly, a simple average is 
used to obtain monthly data. The lags are lagged by one month, two months, three 
months, and six months. The table reports the coefficient, the Newey-West Robust 
standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2, and the number of observations used in 
each regression. The 1% level of significance is represented by ***. The 5% level of 
significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP 
Constant 0.01234*** 0.012269*** 0.012306*** 0.012289*** 0.012379*** 
 (0.000706) (0.00075) (0.0007) (0.00075) (0.000767) 
Banksimg t -0.26776***     
 (0.0548)     
Banksimg t-1  -0.26134***    
  (0.0586)    
Banksimg t-2   -0.26413***   
   (0.0580)   
Banksimg t-3    -0.26411  
    (0.0577)  
Banksimg t-6     -0.27286*** 
     (0.0595) 
Delnspx t 0.018938*** 0.019021*** 0.019108*** 0.019325*** 0.019463*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.00286) (0.00288) 
Adjr R2 0.1868 0.1810 0.1815 0.1826 0.1879 
Obs 467 466 465 464 461 
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Table 1.7: The effect of moral hazard proxied by accounting measures on aggregate 
IPO activities after controlling for the free cash flow problem. 
(I) The independent variables are Current, MBA, and Delnspx. Current is defined as 
current assets divided by current liabilities. MBA is the total market value of the asset 
to the total book value of the asset. It is used a proxy for the investment opportunity. 
Delnspx is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) minus its one-year moving average. The 
dependent variables are IPO_GDP, IPO_CPI, and LNIPON. IPO_GDP is the total 
equity issued per month divided by GDP (current dollars and seasonally adjusted). 
IPO_CPI is the total equity issued divided by seasonally adjusted CPI. LNIPON is the 
natural log of the monthly number of IPOs. The table reports the coefficient, the 
Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2, and the number of 
observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance is represented by 
***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance 
is represented by *. 
 
 I 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON 
Constant 0.00151 -13.8528* 0.215277 
 (0.00155) (7.1631) (0.5157) 
Current 0.00229*** 14.2298*** 0.740386*** 
 (0.0005) (2.5014) (0.1472) 
MBA 0.000027 0.43037 -0.00503* 
 (0.000036) (0.2674) (0.00297) 
Delnspx 0.01667*** 50.85714** 4.565283*** 
 (0.00281) (15.5242) (0.8189) 
Adj R2 0.2139 0.2867 0.3600 
Obs 455 455 438 
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
(II) The dependent variables and the MBA, as well as the Delnspx, are the same as 
those in the previous table. The independent variable is Cash defined as cash divided 
by current liabilities. In group III, the dependent variables and the MBA, as well as the 
Delnspx, are the same as those in group I, and the independent variable is Quick 
defined as (current assets-inventory) divided by current liabilities. The table reports 
the coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2, 
and the number of observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance 
is represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% 
level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 II 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON 
Constant 0.006*** 11.4157*** 1.62758*** 
 (0.0006) (2.2052) (0.2554) 
Cash 0.001893*** 13.56799*** 0.635269*** 
 (0.000432) (1.9751) (0.1296) 
MBA 0.000014 0.308579 -0.00951* 
 (0.000033) (0.2385) (0.00409) 
Delnspx 0.01714*** 51.60372** 4.797856*** 
 (0.00276) (14.1025) (0.7581) 
Adj R2 0.2171 0.3380 0.3799 
Obs 455 455 438 
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
(III). The dependent variables and the MBA, as well as the Delnspx, are the same as 
those in group I, and the independent variable is Quick defined as (current assets-
inventory) divided by current liabilities. The table reports the coefficient, the Newey-
West Robust standard error in the bracket, the adjusted R2, and the number of 
observations used in each regression. The 1% level of significance is represented by 
***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance 
is represented by *. 
 
 III 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON 
Constant 0.004716*** 1.310134 1.21987** 
 (0.00107) (3.9123) (0.3765) 
Quick 0.001711*** 12.5097*** 0.56292*** 
 (0.00035) (1.9171) (0.1282) 
MBA 0.00002 0.346487 -0.0074** 
 (0.000034) (0.2436) (0.0037) 
Delnspx 0.017736*** 55.60887*** 4.94647*** 
 (0.00279) (14.3083) (0.7613) 
Adj R2 0.2067 0.3225 0.3486 
Obs 455 455 438 
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Table 1.8: The effect of moral hazard proxied by bankruptcy records on aggregate IPO 
activities after controlling for the free cash flow problem. 
(I). The independent variable is MBA, Delnspx and Banksimg, or Banksimc. Delnspx 
is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) deducted by its one-year moving average. MBA is the 
total market value of the asset to the total book value of the asset. It is used as a proxy 
for the investment opportunity. Banksimg is monthly business bankruptcy filings 
divided by seasonally adjusted GDP, and Banksimc is monthly business bankruptcy 
filings divided by seasonally adjusted CPI. The dependent variables are IPO_GDP, 
IPO_CPI, and LNIPON. IPO_GDP is the total equity issued per month divided by 
GDP (current dollars and seasonally adjusted). IPO_CPI is the total equity issued 
divided by seasonally adjusted CPI. LNIPON is the natural log of the monthly number 
of IPOs. The table reports the coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error in 
the bracket, the adjusted R2, and the number of observations used in each regression. 
The 1% level of significance is represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is 
represented by **. The 10% level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 I 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON LNIPON 
Constant 0.01217*** 60.1589*** 3.2508*** 2.8889*** 
 (0.000948) (6.5125) (0.1876) (0.2031) 
Banksimg -0.26063**  -46.659**  
 (0.0689)  (17.0805)  
Banksimc  -0.7448***  -0.00512 
  (0.1530)  (0.00551) 
MBA -3.94E-7 0.22889 -0.00667 0.00061 
 (0.000028) (0.2127) (0.00474) (0.00361) 
Delnspx 0.020204*** 88.9764*** 5.1612*** 5.0264*** 
 (0.00286) (13.5743) (0.7815) (0.7892) 
Adj R2 0.1919 0.2962 0.1968 0.1560 
Obs 464 464 446 446 
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
(II). The dependent variables and the MBA, as well as the Delnspx, are the same as 
those in the previous table. The independent variable is Bankintg or Banksintc. These 
are the same as those in group I, except that linear interpolation is used to obtain the 
monthly data. The table reports the coefficient, the Newey-West Robust standard error 
in the bracket, the adjusted R2, and the number of observations used in each 
regression. The 1% level of significance is represented by ***. The 5% level of 
significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 II 
 IPO_GDP IPO_CPI LNIPON LNIPON 
Constant 0.01216*** 60.41468*** 3.2539*** 2.88644*** 
 (0.000959) (6.5838) (0.1892) (0.2042) 
Bankintg -0.25904**  -46.9099**  
 (0.0694)  (17.2626)  
Bankintc  -0.74977***  -0.005305 
  (0.1547)  (0.00556) 
MBA -2.17E-7 0.224619 -0.00673 0.000641 
 (0.000028) (0.2118) (0.00477) (0.0036) 
Delnspx 0.019995*** 87.6666*** 5.1534*** 5.02221*** 
 (0.00287) (13.5264) (0.7812) (0.7892) 
Adj R2 0.1905 0.2956 0.1968 0.1558 
Obs 464 464 446 446 
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Table 1.9: The effect of financial health in the past on aggregate IPO activities after  
controlling for the free cash flow problem  
The dependent variable is IPO_GDP. IPO_GDP is the total equity issued per month 
divided by GDP. The independent variables are MBA, Delnspx, Current, and its lags. 
MBA is the total market value of the asset to the total book value of the asset. Delnspx 
is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) deducted by its one-year moving average. Current is 
defined as current assets divided by current liabilities. The lags are lagged by one 
month, two months, three months, and six months. The table reports the same 
statistics. The 1% level of significance, the 5% level of significance and the 10% level 
of significance are represented by ***, **,* respectively.  
 IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP 
Constant 0.00151 0.001001 0.001161 0.002237** 0.001782 
 (0.00155) (0.00147) (0.00142) (0.00145) (0.00156) 
Current t 0.00229***     
 (0.0005)     
MBA t 0.000027     
 (0.000036)     
Current t-1  0.002465***    
  (0.000482)    
MBA t-1  0.000023    
  (0.000035)    
Current t-2   0.002424***   
   (0.000467)   
MBA t-2   0.000023   
   (0.000031)   
Current t-3    0.002085***  
    (0.00046)  
MBA t-3    0.00003  
    (0.000028)  
Current t-6     0.002255*** 
     (0.0005) 
MBA t-6     0.00002 
     (0.00003) 
Delnspxt 0.01667*** 0.01628*** 0.01623*** 0.017154*** 0.017003*** 
 (0.00281) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.00281) (0.00286) 
Adjr R2 0.2139 0.2149 0.2054 0.1891 0.1951 
Obs 455 455 455 455 452 
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Table 1.10: The effect of the past bankruptcy record on the aggregate IPO activities 
after controlling for the free cash flow problem 
The dependent variable is IPO_GDP. IPO_GDP is the total equity issued per month 
divided by GDP. The independent variables are MBA, Delnspx, Current, and its lags. 
MBA is the total market value of the asset to the total book value of the asset. Delnspx 
is ln(monthly S&P 500 index) deducted by its one-year moving average. Banksimg is 
monthly business bankruptcy filings divided by seasonally adjusted GDP. The lags are 
lagged by one month, two months, three months, and six months. The table reports the 
same statistics. The 1% level of significance, the 5% level of significance and the 10% 
level of significance are represented by ***, **,*. 
 IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP IPO_GDP 
Constant 0.01217*** 0.012272*** 0.012431*** 0.012305*** 0.0126*** 
 (0.000948) (0.000955) (0.000932) (0.000949) (0.000962) 
Banksimg t -0.26063**     
 (0.0689)     
MBA t -3.94E-7     
 (0.000028)     
Banksimg t-1  -0.26305***    
  (0.0689)    
MBA t-1  -0.34E-6    
  (0.000026)    
Banksimg t-2   -0.27147***   
   (0.0671)   
MBA t-2   -5.63E-6   
   (0.000022)   
Banksimg t-3    -0.26512***  
    (0.0685)  
MBA t-3    -8.01E-7  
    (0.000022)  
Banksimg t-6     -0.28732*** 
     (0.069) 
MBA t-6     -0.00001 
     (0.00002) 
Delnspx t 0.020204*** 0.019596*** 0.01898*** 0.01933*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.00286) (0.00297) (0.00309) (0.00286) (0.0029) 
Adjr R2 0.1919 0.1789 0.1747 0.1808 0.1868 
Obs 464 464 464 464 461 
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Table 2.1: Sample selection 
Total number of listed firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008              854 
- The number of firms that were newly listed in 2008                       6                
- Number of firms whose stock investment activities in 2007 were hard to observe 
from the annual report                                             186 
=   Number of firms that participated in stock transactions in 2007            209            
+   Number of firms that did not hold stocks in 2007                       453 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Out of 209 firms: 
Total number of nonfinancial firms that participated in stock transactions in 2007 198 
- Number of firms that did not rely heavily on the stock capital gains in 20078    74 
=  Number of firms that relied heavily on stock capital gains in 2007          124  
 
Out of 453 firms: 
Total number of nonfinancial firms that did not hold stocks in 2007            444 
 
The final sample for the study is 80 firms from the 125 sample and matched 81 firms 
from the 444 sample. The reason why 80 firms are the final sample is that when 
matching some firms could not find the matched firm in the same industry or could not 
find the matched firm with a similar size. Here the similar size is considered as the 
size of the matched firm is not beyond the +/- 120% of the target firm’s size.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
If the operating income is negative and the investment net income that might be due to the stock 
investment is positive, then this firm is regarded as relying quite heavily on the stock capital gains. If 
the operating income and the investment net income that might be due to the stock investment are 
positive and the ratio of the investment net income that might be due to the stock investment over the 
operating income is greater than 0.01, then the firm is regarded as relying quite heavily on the stock 
capital gains. 
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Table 2.2-2007: Earnings growth in 2007 and 2008 
The following tables show the descriptive statistics for the growth rate for earnings 
components in 2007. op is the growth rate for main operating profit. Main operating 
profit is defined as operating revenue minus operating cost; inv is the growth rate for 
investment net income that excludes profits from invested companies; opt is the 
growth rate of operating profit which includes both main operating profit and 
investment net income. The sign test probability is listed in the table to show if the 
median of the growth is statistically different from zero. The 1% level of significance 
is represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **.  The 10% 
level of significance is represented by *. 
 
2007 Group N Mean Median Std Min Max t p sign test p 
op  
Bad 43 0.011 -0.186 0.95 -0.9 4.730  0.073  0.955 0.911 
  Good 54 0.618 0.132 2.25 -0.9 15.2 2.014 0.049** 0.22 
inv  
Bad 65 11.636  2.268  24.6 -0.9 137.5  3.812 0.0003*** <0.0001***  
  Good 49 2.996 0 11.6 -1 61.7 1.814 0.076* 0.201 
opt  
Bad 62 1.676  0.219 4.75 -0.9  26.5 2.776 0.0073*** 0.0071*** 
  Good 62 1.016 0.213 3.07 -1.0 17.118 2.608 0.011 0.007*** 
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Table 2.2-2008: Earnings growth in 2007 and 2008 
The following tables show the descriptive statistics for the growth rate of the earnings 
components in 2008. op is the growth rate of main operating profit. Main operating 
profit is defined as operating revenue minus operating cost; inv is the growth rate of 
investment net income that excludes profits from invested companies; opt is the 
growth rate for operating profit which includes both main operating profit and 
investment net income. The sign test probability is listed in the table to show if the 
median of the growth is statistically different from zero. The 1% level of significance 
is represented by ***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% 
level of significance is represented by *. 
 
2008 Group N Mean Median Std Min Max t p sign test p 
op  Bad 39 0.852 0.066 4.32 -0.87  26.63 1.233 0.225 0.871 
  Good 49 0.882 0.018 4.85 -0.95 33.4 1.272 0.201 0.471 
inv  
Bad 56 -0.58 -0.607 0.32 -1 0.38  -13.6 <0.0001 <0.0001*** 
  Good 40 4.909 -0.174 23.43 -99.5  161.07  1..325 0.193 0.099 
opt  
Bad 51 -0.05 -0.289 1.60 -1 10.713 -0.20 0.841 0.0002*** 
  Good 55 0.097 -0.014 0.95 -0.94 5.865 0.761 0.450 1 
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Table 2.3: Testing earnings components contribution to the future earnings. 
Earningst+1 = b + bopa*operating incomet + bia*inv incomet + vt+1 
The sample consists of observations from 2006 to 2008. Earnings is net earnings 
divided by average total assets. Operating income is main operating income divided by 
average total assets. Investment net income is investment net income listed in the 
income statement minus profit from investing in other firms. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The 1% level of significance is represented by ***. The 5% level of 
significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance is represented by *. 
 
 Earningst+1 Earningst+1 
Earningst+1 
(rank) 
Earningst+1 
(rank) 
intercept  0.03*** 0.03*** 1.48*** 1.70*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.36) (0.24) 
Operating 
income 0.28*** 
 0.5***  
 (0.05)  (0.05)  
Investment net 
income 0.08 
 0.18**  
 (0.13)  (0.05)  
Earningst  0.23***  0.64*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Adjr-R2 0.08 0.09 0.26 0.39 
Obs 320 320 320 320 
     
H0 :bopa=1; 
H1:bopa<1 
Rejected H0  
***  
 Rejected H0  
***  
 
H0 : bia=1; 
H1:bia<1 
Rejected H0  
***    
 Rejected H0  
***  
 
H0 : bopa=bia; 
H1:bopa>bia  Cannot reject  
 Rejected H0  
***  
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Table 2.4: The Mishkin Test of the market pricing of earnings components with 
respect to their implications for one-year-ahead earnings 
Operating income is main operating income divided by average total assets for each 
listed firm. Investment net income is investment net income listed in the income 
statement minus profits from investing in the other firms. This is also a firm-year 
observation. Adjusted returns are computed by taking raw returns and subtracting the 
market returns during the same period from the raw returns for each listed firm. The 
return cumulating period starts at the announcement date and ends one year later. The 
sample consists of firm-year observations between 2006 and 2008.  
 
Panel A: market pricing of earnings components with respect to their implications for 
one-year-ahead earnings 
      Earningst+1 = b + bopa*operating incomet + bia*inv incomet + vt+1 
       AdjrRt+1 = a + β*( Earningst+1-b-bop*operating incomet -bi*inv incomet) + εt+1 
 
Parameter Estimate Std Parameter Estimate Std 
bopa  0.5 0.05 bop 0.14 0.29 
bia 0.18 0.05 bi 0.21 0.27 
 
Panel B: Tests of rational pricing of earnings components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Null Hypotheses   
Likelihood 
Ratio 
Statistics 
0.1 significant level ‘s critical 
value 
bop=bopa and 
bi=bia   1.86 4.61 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics for the adjusted return  
The following tables show the descriptive statistics for adjusted returns for the bad 
group and those for the good group in 2007 and 2008. Adjusted returns are computed 
by taking raw returns and subtracting market returns during the same period from the 
raw returns for each listed firm. The return cumulating period starts at the 
announcement date and ends one year later. The sign rank test probability is listed in 
the table to show whether the median of the growth is statistically different from zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 Group N Mean Median Std Min Max 
  
Adjr07  Bad 80 0.152 0.058 0.454 -0.54 1.92 
 Good 79 0.257 0.072 0.645 -0.65 3.24 
  
Adjr08  Bad 80 0.113 0.074 0.207 -0.18  0.74 
 Good 80 0.133 0.104 0.23  -0.33 1.17  
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Table 2.6:Adjrt+1 = a + a1*groupt + a2*industry + a3*sizet + vt+1 
Adjusted returns are computed by taking raw returns and subtracting market returns 
during the same period from the raw returns for each listed firm. The return 
cumulating period starts at the announcement date and ends one year later. If the group 
is 1, that indicates that the firm is in the good group. If the group is 0, that indicates 
that the firm is in the bad group. Industry is defined by China’s Securities Regulatory 
Commission. These definitions have both broad and the detailed versions. Here the 
detailed versions are used. Size is the total market value at the end of the calendar 
year. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 1% level of significance is represented by 
***. The 5% level of significance is represented by **. The 10% level of significance 
is represented by *. 
 
 
 Adjr2007 Adjr2007  (rank) Adjr2008 Adjr2008  (rank) 
intercept 4.91*** 27.06*** 0.77 16.04** 
 (1.15) (5.87) (0.48) (6.39) 
Group 0.11 0.27 0.02 0.40 
 (0.08) (0.4) (0.03) (0.44) 
Industry -0.03* -0.20*** 0.02** 0.18** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.006) (0.07) 
Size -0.2*** -0.95*** -0.04* -0.60** 
 (0.05) (0.26) (0.02) (0.28) 
Adjr-R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Obs 159 159 160 160 
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